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Abstract
This paper analyzes a suppliers incentives to foreclose downstream entry when
entrants have stronger positions in di¤erent market segments, thus bringing added
value as well as competition. We rst consider the case where wholesale contracts
take the form of linear tari¤s, and characterize the conditions under which the
competition-intensifying e¤ect dominates, thereby leading to foreclosure. We then
show that foreclosure can still occur with non-linear tari¤s, even coupled with
additional provisions such as resale price maintenance.
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1 Introduction
Many industries have seen the emergence of new distribution channels, such as mobile
virtual network operators (MVNOs) in the telecommunication industry, or platforms such
as Amazon.com or Alibaba.com in online retailing. These new channels often appeal to
di¤erent types of customers. For example, MVNOs typically o¤er cheaper no-frillsser-
vices, targeting price-sensitive or younger customers. Similarly, online platforms attract
a broad audience whereas established brick-and-mortar stores appeal more to consumers
with high brand loyalty. A challenge for these entrants, however, is to secure access
to established suppliers. For example, MVNOs do not possess their own networks and
therefore need access to existing networks. Similarly, online platforms must convince
manufacturers to distribute their products through their channels.1
When deciding on whether to grant access to their products, the incumbents face a
trade-o¤. Entrants bring value by attracting di¤erent types of consumers. In theory, the
incumbents may benet from this through appropriate wholesale arrangements. In prac-
tice, however, it may be di¢ cult to limit entry to specic segments and, more generally,
to control entrantsmarketing strategies; they may then compete with the incumbents,
thereby dissipating prot, and may even end-up challenging incumbentscore business.
To study this trade-o¤, we develop a simple framework with one incumbent at both
upstream and downstream levels, and two market segments. The downstream incumbent
has a strong position in the high-end segment, and faces an entrant bringing value in
the low-end segment. We rst characterize the drivers of the incumbentsdecision to
accommodate entry or foreclose the market when contractual arrangements are limited to
linear wholesale tari¤s. We then show that general non-linear tari¤s even coupled with
additional vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance (RPM) may not su¢ ce
to maximize industry prot or ensure entry accommodation, as the entrant will target
the high-end segment whenever the margins are larger there. As a result, foreclosure may
occur.
The literature on vertical foreclosure often focuses on linear tari¤s,2 thus leaving open
the question of whether foreclosure may still occur when more elaborate contracts are
feasible. The few papers allowing non-linear wholesale tari¤s (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990,
OBrien and Sha¤er, 1992) indeed emphasize that full exclusion is never optimal when the
entrant o¤ers a di¤erentiated good, as non-linear tari¤s allow the supplier to extract the
higher industry prots.3 In contrast, we nd that when rms can target specic market
1In the telecommunication industry, MNOs foreclosed MVNOs in several countries (e.g., Spain or
Poland) without regulation of the market (see European Commission, 2006). Also, many established
apparel producers o¤er no or only a small selection of their products on Internet retailers.
2See, e.g., Ordover et al. (1990), Chen (2001), Sappington (2005), Ordover and Sha¤er (2007), Hoe­ er
and Schmidt (2008), and Bourreau at al. (2011).
3See Rey and Tirole (2007) for a summary of foreclosure incentives with non-linear tari¤s.
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segments, non-linear tari¤s, even augmented with RPM, do not guarantee entry.4
2 The Model
There are two incumbent rms, U and D. U costlessly supplies an input to D, who
transforms it into a nal good using a one-to-one technology. There is a unit mass of
consumers, with a proportion x having valuations VD and unit costs C, and the others
having valuations vD and unit cost c; the rst group of consumers constitutes the high-
endmarket segment and are more valuable:
VD   C > vD   c:
We will consider two scenarios, in which either the incumbents are vertically integrated,
or they can engage in e¢ cient contracting (e.g., two-part tari¤s); all results are valid in
both scenarios. Throughout the paper, the incumbentswill refer to the integrated rm
in the former scenario, and to the upstream supplier in the latter scenario.
A new rm E can enter the downstream market, with a comparative advantage in the
low-end segment: for the sake of exposition, we suppose that it faces the same costs as D
in each segment, C and c, but o¤er di¤erent values to consumers, VE and vE, satisfying:
vE > vD and VD > VE:
Downstream rms can discriminate consumers across the two segments: each rm
i = D;E sets two prices, Pi in the high-end and pi in the low-end segment.5 By contrast,
we assume that wholesale arrangements cannot be made contingent on targeted segments;
that is, the tari¤ is only based on the quantity bought by E, not on which consumers E
sells to.6
Absent entry, the industry maximizes its prot by setting PD = VD and pD = vD,
yielding a prot of
m  x (VD   C) + (1  x) (vD   c) :
We will assume that foreclosure is more protable than removing D from the market,
4Gabrielsen and Johansen (2017) demonstrate that non-linear tari¤s and RPM are not su¢ cient to
maximize the industry prot if downstream rms must also make investment decisions. However, they
are not concerned with market foreclosure.
5Our insights extend to second-degree price discrimination (i.e., when rms cannot distinguish between
consumers but can o¤er several types of contracts), provided that high-end consumers generate larger
volumes. See Online Appendix D for a formal analysis.
6In practice, rms may not be able or allowed to assign specic customer segments to their distributors
in Europe, for example, manufacturers are prevented from restricting brick-and-mortar retailers to open
online stores as well.
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that is:
m > x (VE   C) + (1  x) (vE   c) : (1)
Throughout the paper, we assume that the incumbents accommodate entry whenever
they are indi¤erent between foreclosing it or not.
3 Linear tari¤s
We rst consider the case of linear tari¤s. The game then consists of the following two
stages: in the rst stage, U o¤ers a wholesale price wE to E (and a two-part tari¤
(FD; wD) to D, if separated), which E (and D) can either accept or reject. In the second
stage, D and E compete in prices.
We then have:
Proposition 1 The incumbents foreclose entry if and only if
x [(VE   C)  (vE   c)] > (1  x)(vE   vD): (2)
Proof. The incumbents can securem by chargingwE = +1 (and (FD = m; wD = 0),
under separation). Furthermore, in order for the incumbents to obtain more prot than
m, E must be serving the low-end segment, which requires wE  vE   c.
Thus, consider wE  vE c and a candidate equilibrium in which E serves the low-end
segment. If E supplies only the low-end segment, then the price at which D serves the
high-end segment must satisfy VD PD  VE (C+wE), as E is willing to serve high-end
consumers at any price above C + wE; hence, the incumbents cannot obtain more than
I = x(PD   C) + (1  x)wE  x(VD   VE) + wE:
If instead E supplies both segments, then the incumbentsprot is equal to wE. It follows
that the maximal prot that the incumbents can obtain does not exceed:
x(VD   VE) + vE   c:
Comparing this expression with m shows that foreclosure occurs whenever (2) holds.
Conversely, entry occurs whenever (2) is not met. Suppose that U sets wE = vE   c,
inducing E to o¤er pE = vE in the low-end segment and PE = vE  c+C in the high-end
segment. If vE   c > VE   C, then E cannot actively compete in the high-end segment
(as PE > VE) and D can thus charge PD = VD in that segment. The incumbents (with
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wD = VD   C, under separation)7 can then obtain the entire monopoly prot, equal to
M = x (VD   C) + (1  x) (vE   c) > m:
If instead vE   c  VE   C, then D can serve the high-end segment at price PD =
C + VD   VE + vE   c. Under vertical integration, the incumbents thus obtain:
 = x(VD   VE) + vE   c;
which exceeds m if (2) does not hold. Under separation, charging wD = vD   c ensures
that D is not willing to serve the low-end segment but is willing to serve the high-end
segment at this price PD, as the margin PD   C = VD   VE + vE   c exceeds wD (using
VD > VE and vE > vD).
The intuition is as follows. Accommodating entry is protable only if E serves the
low-end segment, in which case U optimally charges wE = vE   c to extract Es prot
in that segment. If vE   c  VE   C, then E cannot compete in the high-end segment
(as wE +C exceeds VE), and the incumbents obtain the maximal industry prot; hence,
foreclosure does not occur in equilibrium. By contrast, if vE   c < VE   C, then E can
compete in the high-end segment as well, which reduces the prot that the incumbents
can achieve in that segment. Foreclosure is then optimal if this prot-dissipation e¤ect
(measured by the left-hand side of (2)) o¤-sets the added-value brought by E in the low-
end segment (measured by the right-hand side). As can be seen from (2), this is more
likely when the high-end segment is large (x high), E is relatively less competitive in the
low-end segment ((VE   C)   (vE   c) large), or adds little value to D in that segment
(vE   vD small).
When foreclosure occurs, mandating entry (e.g., by imposing a cap on the wholesale
price wE not exceeding vE   c) can only benet consumers,8 and increase social welfare.
4 Additional contractual provisions
From the previous discussion, if vE c  VE C, then the incumbents obtain the maximal
industry prot. Otherwise, competition in the high-end segment prevents full industry
prot maximization, which in turn can lead to foreclosure. We now analyze whether these
insights carry over with more elaborate wholesale contracts.
We rst note that non-linear tari¤s alone do not restore industry prot maximization:
Proposition 2 If vE   c < VE   C, non-linear tari¤s do not allow the incumbents to
achieve industry prot maximization.
7This in particular ensures that D is not willing to contest E in the low-end segment.
8Consumers benet from a lower price in the high-end market, and may obtain a greater value in the
low-end market if wE < vE   c.
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Proof: See Online Appendix A.
The intuition is that non-linear tari¤s cannot prevent E from diverting part of its sales
to the high-end segment, and E has indeed an incentive to do so whenever its margin
there is larger than the margin in the low-end segment. A common way of controlling
further the behavior of downstream rms is to restrict their prices, a practice known
as Resale Price Maintenance (RPM). In the spirit of the above analysis, we consider
here industry-wideRPM, where the price restrictions cannot be made contingent on
consumer segments.9 If both types of consumers wish to buy at the maintained price,
then the e¤ectiveness of such provisions depends on the extent to which rms have to
satisfy demand. We will consider two polar scenarios: in the rst one (no rationing),
rms cannot ration demand in any way; in the second scenario, rms can not only ration
demand, but moreover select which consumers to serve. The next proposition shows that
combining RPM with non-linear tari¤s enables industry prot maximization in a larger
range of situations, but not always.
Proposition 3 If vE   c < VE   C and non-linear contracts are allowed, then:
(i) If VE  vE, then RPM restores industry prot maximization, regardless of whether
rms can ration demand.10
(ii) If instead VE > vE and C  c, then RPM restores industry prot maximization
when rms can select which buyers to serve.
(iii) Finally, if VE > vE but C < c, then RPM cannot restore industry prot maximiza-
tion, regardless of whether rms can ration demand.
Proof: See Online Appendix B.
If VE > vE and C  c, then, in order to achieve prot maximization with industry-
wide RPM, E must be able to ration demand selectively (namely, to refuse selling to
high-end consumers). If instead E could simply ration demand but not choose its buyers,
then under usual rationing schemes some high-end consumers would end-up buying from
E.
The above propositions characterize the conditions under which the incumbents can
obtain the industry monopoly prot. When this is not the case, they may be tempted
to foreclose entry. The following Proposition conrms this possibility; for the sake of
exposition, we focus on the case where rms can selectively ration consumers:
9If the incumbents could monitor sales and set separate RPM prices on each segment, then the
contract would impose a price oor on the high-end market segment and foreclosure would not occur.
10In that case, simple linear tari¤s actually su¢ ce to achieve industry prot maximization.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that rms can use RPM and select which buyers to serve, C < c
and VE > vE. Regardless of whether non-linear contracts are allowed, foreclosure occurs
if and only if
x (VE   vE) > (1  x) (vE   vD) :
Proof: See Online Appendix C.
Hence, foreclosure can still occur with RPM. Comparing the condition of Proposition
4 with that of Proposition 1 shows that it occurs for a smaller parameter range with
RPM than without (because C < c).
We conclude with a discussion of the impact of non-linear tari¤s and RPM on con-
sumers and society. Obviously, enlarging the set of instruments available has no impact
when the incumbents achieve the industry monopoly outcome with linear tari¤s, which
is the case if vE   c  VE   C. When instead vE   c < VE   C, allowing non-linear
tari¤s and RPM can only increase the prot derived from accommodating entry, which
enhances total welfare. The impact on consumers is more ambivalent, and depends on
what happens in the benchmark situation (i.e., with linear tari¤s and no RPM):
 When foreclosure occurs, consumers obtain no surplus. In that situation, enlarging
the set of instruments benets consumers if: (i) it induces entry; and (ii) it does
not allow the incumbents to achieve the industry monopoly outcome. This is indeed
the case when VE > vE, C < c, and:
x [(VE   C)  (vE   c)] > (1  x)(vE   vD)  x (VE   vE) :
In that case, allowing (non-linear tari¤s and) RPM induces the incumbent to ac-
commodate entry, and high-end consumers benet from some competition (D serves
them at price P^D < VD).
 When instead entry occurs, consumers obtain some surplus; in that situation, which
arises when
x [(VE   C)  (vE   c)]  (1  x)(vE   vD);
allowing non-linear tari¤s and RPM harms consumers, by allowing the incumbents
to increase the price charged in the high-end segment (namely, from PD = VD  
[(VE   C)  (vE   c)] to either P^D = PD + c  C if c > C and VE > vE, and up to
VD otherwise.
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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
A Proof of Proposition A
To maximize industry prot, D must serve high-end consumers at price VD and E must
serve the low-end segment at price vE. However, E can divert one unit from low-end
consumers and sell it in to the high-end segment at price (slightly below) VE, and has
indeed the incentive to do so if VE   C > vE   c.
B Proof of Proposition B
(i) If VE  vE, then consumers from the high-end segment are not interested in buying
from E at price pE = vE. The incumbents can thus obtain the industry monopoly prot
by charging wE = vE c, together with an RPM provision requiring E to charge pE = vE.
E is willing to accept this contract and can then only sell to the low-end segment at that
price. Furthermore, under integration, D has no incentive to compete in the low-end
market, as Us upstream margin, wE = vE   c, exceeds Ds downstream margin, vD   c;
similarly, under separation, charging wD = VD   C ensures that D does not want to sell
to the low-end segment (as wD = VD   C > vD   c, which is the largest margin D could
obtain in the low-end segment) and appropriates all of Ds prot.
(ii) If instead VE > vE and C  c, charging wE = vE   c achieves industry prot
maximization if E can select its buyers: E is then willing to accept this contract and
to serve the low-end segment at price pE = vE, and is not willing to serve the high-end
segment at that price;1 furthermore, as in case (i), D has no incentive to compete with
E in the low-end segment under integration, and under separation when wD = VD   C.
(iii) Finally, suppose that VE > vE but C < c. From the proof of Proposition 2, as
vE   c < VE   C, the incumbents cannot achieve industry prot maximization if they
do not sign an RPM contract with E. With an industry-wide RPM provision (for E, or
for both downstream rms), D must charge PD = VD, and E must charge pE = vE in
both segments. If VE > vE, consumers from the high-end segments are then willing to
buy from E, and E nds it protable to divert sales from the low-end to the high-end
segment whenever C < c.
C Proof of Proposition C
To characterize the prot that the incumbents can achieve by accommodating entry, we
rst provide a lower bound, and show that it cannot be improved.
1In the limit case C = c, E is indi¤erent between serving that segment or not, and is thus willing to
serve only the low-end segment.
1
Suppose that U o¤ers to supplyE at wholesale price wE = vE c, together with a RPM
provision requiring E to set pE = vE. Under integration, E then wins the competition for
the low-end segment (as the integrated rms upstream margin, wE = vE   c, exceeds its
own downstream margin, vD c); it follows that D wins the competition for the high-end
segment, at price P^D  VD   VE + vE: indeed, D slightly undercuts E in that segment,
as the associated margin, P^D   C = VD   VE + vE   C, exceeds the integrated rms
upstream margin, wE = vE   c.2 Under separation, U can achieve the same outcome
(and appropriate all the prots) by supplying D at wholesale price wD = P^D   C: D
(resp., E) then sells the high-end (resp., low-end) market at price P^D (resp., vE) and
cannot protably serve the other segment. Hence, the resulting prot for the incumbents
is given by:
^ = x(VD   VE + vE   C) + (1  x)(vE   c):
Suppose now that there exists an alternative equilibrium in which the incumbents
accommodate entry and obtain a prot  > ^. This prot must be at least equal to
m, otherwise the incumbents would not accommodate entry; using (1), it must therefore
satisfy:
 > max
n
^; x (VE   C) + (1  x) (vE   c)
o
= x

max
n
P^D; VE
o
  C

+ (1  x) (vE   c) : (3)
Furthermore, as the entrant cannot lose money in equilibrium, the incumbentsprot, ,
cannot exceed the maximal industry prot, and thus:
x (max fPD; VEg   C) + (1  x) (vE   c)  ; (4)
where PD denotes Ds equilibrium price. To see this, note that vE   c is an upper bound
on the margin obtained in the low-end segment, and max fPD; VEg   C an upper bound
on the margin obtained in the high-end segment: either D sells, or E sells at a price that
cannot exceed VE. It follows from (3) and (4) that PD > P^D.
Next, we note that E must be serving (part of) the low-end segment: otherwise,
foreclosure would be more protable. This, in turn, requires pE  vE. High-end consumers
would therefore be willing to buy from E at price pE (as pE  vE and PD > P^D).
Moreover, as C < c, E prefers serving the high-end segment at pE than serving low-end
consumers at the same price. As it can select which buyers to serve, it follows that E
must be serving the entire high-end segment, at some price PE  VE, as well as (part of)
the low-end segment. As the margin on the low-end segment cannot exceed vE   c, the
2This amounts to VD   VE + vE   C > vE   c, which follows from VD > VE and C < c.
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resulting industry prot is thus bounded by:
x (VE   C) + (1  x) (vE   c) :
From (1), this prot is lower than m, a contradiction.
It follows that the incumbentsprot must be equal to ^. Comparing ^ with m
yields the condition in the Proposition.
D Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In this Appendix we show how our analysis can apply to the case of second-degree price
discrimination, where rms cannot explicitly discriminate consumers (e.g., because they
do not identify consumerstypes, or because of a legal ban on such discrimination) but
can o¤er multiple contracts, designed for di¤erent types.
To this end, we modify the baseline model by assuming that high-end consumers must
get at least N > 1 units in order to obtain the utility VD or VE; otherwise, their utility is
zero. The other assumptions remain unchanged: low-end consumers only need one unit
to obtain the utility vD or vE,3 and the costs of serving high-end and low-end consumers
are still C and c, respectively (note that C now denotes the total cost of supplying N
units to a high-end consumer).
To discriminate consumers, each rm i = D;E can o¤er two options: a single unit at
price pi and a bundle of N units at price Pi. For the sake of exposition, we will assume
that low-end consumers cannot unbundlemulti-unit options (high-end consumers may
however satisfy their needs by combining several single-unit options). As a result, if N is
large, namely, if
NvD  VD;
then absent entry the incumbents can still extract all the surplus from consumers (by
charging VD and vD to high-end and low-end consumers, respectively) and obtain:
f = x (VD   C) + (1  x) (vD   c) :
For the sake of exposition, we focus here on the case where the wholesale contract
between U and E simply consists of a linear tari¤, and denote the wholesale price by wE.
Following the same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1, it can be checked that, to
maximize their prot, the incumbents must charge wE = vE   c and induce E to supply
low-end consumers (and only those) at price pE = vE. High-end consumers are then
not tempted to buy from E (at unit price pE = vE), as the above condition NvD  VD
3For exampe, the low-end segment may correspond to households and the high-end segment to busi-
nesses, requiring larger volumes.
3
(combined with vE > vD and VD > VE) implies NvE > VE. However, instead of making
zero prot in the low-end segment, E could target high-end consumers by o¤ering them
N units at a price above the associated cost, equal to C+ (vE   c)N ; if this cost is lower
than VE and larger than vE,4 then E indeed exerts competitive pressure on D, preventing
it to charge more than
P^D = VD   VE + C + (vE   c)N:
Summing-up, if VE C > (vE   c)N  vE C, the maximal prot from accommodating
entry is
x [VD   C   (VE   C) + (vE   c)N ] + (1  x)(vE   c):
Comparing this prot with f , foreclosure is optimal if and only if
x ((VE   C)  (vE   c)N) > (1  x)(vE   vD):
We therefore obtain a very similar conclusion as in the baseline model: E still has an
incentive to target the most protable segment, which limits the incumbentsability to
exploit high-end consumers; this may induce the incumbents to foreclose entry.
4The case C+(vE   c)N < vE does not look plausible and would induce E to sell the N -unit package
at a minimal price P^ = x [C + (vE   c)N ] + (1  x) vE .
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